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Abstract
Due to changing circumstances and new challenges, the Nordic Council of Ministers underwent an incremental process of
change and some modest transformation since the 1990s. However, there has never been a major overhaul of structures
and contents owing to considerable inertia. Themost recentmodernisation process, aiming atmore political relevance and
flexibility, has been ambitious but whether it has been a success remains unclear thus far. Weaknesses and limits in cooper-
ation in the Nordic Council of Ministers are obvious, i.e., no majority voting or ‘opting-out’ system, a lack in supra-national
structures and policies and no common immigration, foreign, security and EU policies. Nonetheless, the organisation has
at least some relevance and meaning for the Nordic countries and the potential to promote and facilitate cooperation in
policy areas in which common interests exist, such as environment, climate, research and social affairs. Therefore, rather
than constituting a common political order of its own, Nordic cooperation, as it is conducted within the Nordic Council
of Ministers, is best characterized by differentiated integration, promoting full integration only to a limited extent but
respecting integration to different extents and speeds by fostering cooperation and coordination of certain policies where
possible and desired.
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1. Introduction
Since their inauguration, the main institutions of Nordic
cooperation—the intergovernmental Nordic Council of
Ministers and the inter-parliamentary Nordic Council—
have persistently had to react to new challenges and
external changes. This meant adapting to new circum-
stances in order to maintain or, in the optimum case,
to increase their political relevance and impact. This
was highlighted in the period after the end of the
Cold War and around the EU accession of Sweden and
Finland in 1995 and to a lesser extent after the EU
wider enlargement in 2004. In response to new circum-
stances and major internal and external challenges—for
example East–West tensions, security, migration, Brexit
and the crisis of the welfare state—a new ambitious
reform process in the Nordic Council of Ministers was
launched in 2014. Addressing intra-Nordic cooperation,
the most important ambitions entailed a more political
approach to cooperation, the inclusion of new policy
areas, more flexible institutional structures and various
new structures. Considering the increasinglymore impor-
tant external dimension of Nordic cooperation, under-
taking new steps towards a closer Nordic EU coopera-
tion and greater internationalization were also part of
the ambition.
However, it still has to be examined whether and, if
so, to what extent, the most recent reforms and relat-
ed institutional changes have been effective and have
contributed to making the Nordic Council of Ministers
stronger, more influential, politically relevant and flexi-
ble. Several indicators speak for this, others do not as
will be elaborated in this article. The Nordic Council
of Ministers still lacks any supranational elements and
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competences in key areas of politics (i.e., foreign affairs,
security and immigration). Furthermore, a real common
Nordic EU-policy in which the Nordic Council ofMinisters
would play a significant role still does not exist.
The article first provides a brief overview of the
Nordic Council of Minister’s development, functions,
structures and relevance within the wider context of
Nordic cooperation as well as an account of changes
and institutional reforms within the Nordic Council of
Ministers since the 1990s. The article’s main objectives
are to take stock and to examine themost recent changes
in the structures and working modes of the Nordic
Council of Ministers since 2014 and their implications
for the organisation’s political relevance and impact. For
this purpose, a thorough content analysis of policy doc-
uments by the Nordic Council of Ministers and national
governments aswell as academic literature has been con-
ducted. Relevant statements and indications for and/or
against the organisation’s adaptability and political rele-
vance have been derived from these texts and analysed.
While paying attention primarily to the Nordic Council
of Ministers, occasional references to the Nordic Council
are also made where appropriate and relevant for the
analysis since both organisations are closely interlinked.
Reform efforts in one body often have repercussions for
the other.
2. The Nordic Council of Ministers: Development,
Functions and Structures
Nordic cooperation was institutionalized over the course
of several decades. While cooperation has taken place
before on a loose basis, the inter-parliamentary Nordic
Council was established in 1952 as a first important
step in efforts to shape a permanent institutional foun-
dation. However, the body came into existence with-
out any international treaty basis. Its inauguration was
only endorsed by the national parliaments (Laursen &
Olesen, 1998, p. 24). Only when the ‘Nordic Cooperation
Treaty’/‘Helsinki agreement’ was signed in 1962, was
Nordic cooperation provided with at least some sort of
legal framework. The Treaty’s adoption was “a milestone
in Nordic cooperation” (Wendt, 1981, p. 39). Despite its
general and non-obligatory character, the Treaty clarified
whatNordic cooperation should incorporate aswell as its
main objectives. When the Nordic Council of Ministers
was established and the external pre-conditions for the
cooperation changed, it was subsequently amended in
1971 and 1993.
In its first 20 years of existence, the Nordic Council
not only served as a forum for cooperation among the
parliaments but also among the Nordic countries’ gov-
ernments. The governments’ representatives had, how-
ever, no voting rights in the decision-making process
(Wendt, 1965, p. 12) and most of its activities took place
at the parliamentary level. Nordic governmental coop-
eration activities were sidelined, weak and uncoordinat-
ed (Nordiska Rådet, 1973, p. 26). After failing to imple-
ment new steps of Nordic integration, i.e., the institution-
alized Nordic Economic Community, the Nordic Council
of Ministers was established in 1971 as a separate inter-
governmental institution. Itsmain taskswere to strength-
en ties and to promote more regular and structured
cooperation and coordination among the governments.
As a consequence, the Nordic Council’s role changed as
it then turned into a purely inter-parliamentary organ-
isation. It then became one of the Nordic Council’s
main functions to monitor intergovernmental cooper-
ation and to develop and maintain a good and close
dialogue with the Nordic Council of Ministers (Jutila &
Tikkala, 2009, p. 6). The close links between the par-
liamentary level and the governments and the Nordic
Council of Ministers are an essential part of Nordic coop-
eration. In more recent years, it has become common
practice that government representatives, even prime
ministers, address the annual Nordic Council meetings
and discuss issues of importance with the members of
parliaments. This link is a special feature of Nordic coop-
eration, distinguishing it from other forms of interna-
tional cooperation where the governmental and par-
liamentary levels are more strictly divided (Hagemann,
2005, p. 3). Since then, the main tasks of the Nordic
Council were to issue recommendations to the govern-
ments, take initiatives, give inspiration, exert control and
express criticism (Wendt, 1965, p. 21).
The Nordic Council of Ministers is responsible for the
implementation of common policies and projects with-
in a contractually regulated system of rules. It promotes
and coordinates the cooperation among theNordic coun-
tries’ governments in a wide range of policy areas and
fields of public administration. However, as a general rule
it has been established that Nordic cooperation “nev-
er goes further than the interests of each country per-
mit” (Nordiska Rådet, 1973, p. 27). The Nordic Council
of Ministers’ core activities include social affairs and the
development of the Nordic welfare state model, envi-
ronment, culture as well as research and education. The
cooperation on cultural issues, education and research
is central as these topics form important elements of
Nordic identity in terms of language, culture and val-
ues (Nordisk Ministerråd, 1998, p. 2). This also shows
that Nordic cooperation is not just about states’ inter-
ests; it can be best described as a hybrid of calculated
interest-based and identity-based partnerships (Olsen,
1998, p. 363). It is also within the aforementioned areas
as well as energy, consumer protection, technology and
regional development in which the Nordic Council of
Ministers developed fairly advanced capabilities for prob-
lem solving (Schumacher, 2000a, p. 15). In policy areas
in which common interests do not prevail, there is no
(or very limited) formal and institutionalised coopera-
tion. Traditional foreign policy, (military) security and
defence policy were excluded from formal cooperation,
as was closer economic cooperation. The security pol-
icy traditions, multilateral ties and economic orienta-
tions of the Nordic countries differed too considerably
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in order to render fruitful cooperation on a permanent
basis possible.
Officially, the Nordic countries’ prime ministers head
intergovernmental Nordic cooperation as formalized in
the Nordic Council of Ministers. The prime ministers
meet for informal consultations at least twice a year.
Currently, the organisation consists of eleven ministeri-
al councils. The Ministerial Council for general Nordic
cooperation, consisting of the ministers for Nordic coop-
eration, coordinates, similarly to the Council of General
Affairs of the EU, the formal cooperation. The other ten
councils are responsible for one specific or several poli-
cy areas: labour, sustainable growth, fisheries, aquacul-
ture, agriculture, food and forestry, gender equality, cul-
ture, legislative affairs, environment and climate, health
and social affairs, education and research, and finance.
Since 2016, there is also an ad hoc Council for digital-
ization. Decisions in any of the ministerial councils are
taken by unanimity. The Nordic Council of Ministers is
chaired by a one-year presidency that rotates among the
five member states. The presidency drafts a programme
with priorities, objectives and guidelines for the upcom-
ing year. While the ministers only meet occasionally to
take the political decisions, the Nordic Committee for
Cooperation, consisting of high-level officials from the
Nordic countries’ ministries of foreign affairs, is respon-
sible for the day-to-day coordination of general cooper-
ation and the more technical decision-making process.
Various expert committees of national senior officials
from the various line ministries prepare the decision-
making process and the implementation of activities in
the specific issue areas, supporting the work of respec-
tive ministerial council. The Nordic Council of Ministers
Secretariat in Copenhagen is an important backbone for
the institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation. Its
tasks are to initiate, implement and follow up on pol-
icy decisions; to develop knowledge on which to base
Nordic solutions, and to build networks for the exchange
of experiences and ideas (Nordic Council of Ministers,
2020). The Secretariat is headed by a secretary-general,
usually a senior politician from of one the five member
states, who is responsible for the day-to-day running of
the organisation. The Secretariat employs about 100 peo-
ple divided into three thematic departments, i.e., cul-
ture and resources, growth and climate, and knowledge
and welfare, the Secretary-General’s office in charge of
cross-cutting issues and international affairs, as well as
two supporting departments, namely human resources,
administration and law, and public relations. The Nordic
Council of Ministers runs regional information offices in
the capitals of the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, and used to have offices in St. Petersburg and
Kaliningrad for several years. A wide network of several
institutions, centres and offices work under the auspices
of the Nordic Council of Ministers including, for example,
Nordforsk fostering Nordic research cooperation, Nordic
Energy Research, the Nordic Innovation Centre and vari-
ous cultural institutions.
3. Changes and Institutional Reforms within the Nordic
Council of Ministers
3.1. Reform Efforts since the 1990s
Since they were established, the institutions of Nordic
cooperation had to persistently react to newly emerg-
ing internal and external challenges and to adapt to new
circumstances in order to maintain their relevance. The
external conditions and circumstances for Nordic coop-
eration and its institutions had, in particular, changed
fundamentally by the end of the 1980s and early 1990s
when the Cold War came to an end and the Soviet
Union collapsed. Finland and Sweden joined the EU in
1995, while Norway and Iceland stayed out but joined
the newly established European Economic Area, gain-
ing access to the EU’s internal market by 1994. Thus,
the purpose and the added value of Nordic cooperation
needed to be redefined in relation to European integra-
tion. However, there were significant doubts about the
current and future relevance of institutionalised Nordic
cooperation, some negativism, perceiving in particular
the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Nordic Council
as outdated, and related demands to close these bodies
(for example, Bagerstam, 1995, pp. 11–12). Nonetheless,
there was a widespread notion that Nordic cooperation
and its institutions still had a place within the new inter-
national system but simultaneously had to adapt to “the
needs of the changing external environment” (Stenbäck,
1997, p. 7) as well as the changes in the member states’
national interests and needs.
Both the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council
of Ministers adopted a new three-pillar structure for
their work, covering intra-Nordic cooperation, coop-
eration with the Nordic region’s (‘Norden’) adjacent
areas (the three Baltic states, the Baltic Sea region,
Northwest Russia as well as the Barents and Arctic
regions) and Nordic cooperation in a wider European
context. To match this, the Nordic Council abandoned its
previous committee structure based on particular issue
areas (e.g., economy, environment and culture) and
instead established three committees along the lines of
the three geographically-oriented pillars in 1995. While
looking good on paper, in practice the new structure was
unclear and did not work well. The three committees
had to deal with too many different issues that partly
did not connect. The new structure did also not corre-
spond well with the still more topic-oriented the Nordic
Council of Ministers (Kristiansen, 2001, p. 57). Because
of these shortcomings and after intensive deliberations,
the Nordic Council returned to its original committee
structure in 2001.
The Nordic Council of Ministers initiated a number
of structural changes, such as establishing an annually
rotating Council Presidency among the member coun-
tries for a smoother coordination of its activities and
the aforementioned information offices in the Baltic
States and in St. Petersburg. It reduced the number of
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formal committees of senior officials and the number
of institutions operating under its umbrella and intro-
duced, where necessary, a new definition of their work
(Schumacher, 2000b, p. 214). Furthermore, structures
were created to better coordinate the EU policies of
the Nordic countries such as a contact group consist-
ing of representatives from the permanent representa-
tions of the Nordic countries in Brussels to foster the
cooperation between them and to provide the Nordic
Council of Ministers with relevant information. In addi-
tion, the Nordic Council of Ministers Secretariat jointly
with the permanent representations obtained the sta-
tus of a think-tank on EU-related questions. However,
these measures were not effective or helpful in practice
(Maertens, 1997, p. 42) and were soon abandoned.
In 1997, the Nordic Council of Ministers launched a
‘strategy-project’ that had particular impact on organ-
isational and administrative aspects in relation to the
new political strategies. This was necessary as the Nordic
Council of Ministers’ organisational structure was per-
ceived as confusing, inflexible and full of inertia, becom-
ing a stumbling block for developing the cooperation fur-
ther (Bennedsen, 1998). The project aimed at improve-
ments in the allocation and distribution of responsibil-
ities and competences among the various actors with-
in the system; a re-organisation of the Nordic Council
of Ministers Secretariat; a more effective steering of
agreements and the budget in the Nordic institutions,
and improved control of projects funded from the joint
budget. The Secretariat was enabled to obtain a more
active role in the preparation and implementation of
political decisions in relation to the ministerial councils
(Nordisk Ministerråd, 1998, p. 1). The report Open to
the Winds of Change: Norden 2000 identified several
trends as main challenges and tasks for Nordic cooper-
ation in the 21st century: globalisation, European inte-
gration, environment, democracy, welfare, market and
economy, culture and education, demographic develop-
ment and migration, security and technological devel-
opment (Nordic Council & Nordic Council of Ministers,
2000). The same report was critical of the large num-
ber of ministerial councils (18 at the time) and institu-
tions working under the auspices of the Nordic Council
of Ministers with an eye to effectiveness and efficien-
cy. Therefore, a reform in 2005–2006 aimed at reduc-
ing the number of ministerial councils from 18 to 11,
partly through mergers, in order to establish a clearer
prioritisation and to render Nordic cooperation more
effective, focussed, dynamic, forward-looking, concrete
and politically as relevant as possible (Hedegaard, 2005,
pp. 2, 35). In order to match the new political structures
and their thematic focus and to shape clearer responsi-
bilities, the Nordic Council of Ministers Secretariat was
subsequently reorganised in terms of the four sectoral
departments’ issue-related competences and responsi-
bilities, aswere the budgetary structures and procedures.
An evaluation of the 2005 reforms suggested several fur-
ther measures, for example another restructuring of the
secretariat, reducing the number of departments from
four to the current three, and establishing guidelines
for better cooperation between secretariat and presiden-
cies, clearly outlining the respective responsibilities and
tasks, adopted in 2009. The main aim with all these mea-
sures was to renew the Nordic Council of Ministers con-
stantly so that it could remain a political institution com-
patible with the times (Nordisk Ministerråd, 2009, p. 30).
3.2. Modernisation Process 2014–2017
Thiswas also themain objective of a newprocess ofmod-
ernisation and reform from 2013/2014, addressing new
challenges and demands as well as criticisms. Despite
earlier efforts to become more flexible, dynamic and
demand-oriented, an often heard criticism was that the
Nordic Council ofMinisters was still too bureaucratic and
cumbersome, lacking clear political substance, relevance
and leadership (Strang, 2012, p. 66). This process was
officially launched when the ministers for Nordic cooper-
ation developed four visions for future cooperation titled
Tillsammans är vi starkare (‘Togetherwe are stronger’) in
February 2014 (Nordisk Ministerråd, 2014a). The visions
included both inward- and outward-looking ambitions.
On the one hand, efforts of traditional Nordic cooper-
ation were to be continued: to strive for a borderless
Nordic region, especially in terms of further removing
border obstacles to continue allowing free movement
for all citizens and companies across Nordic borders, and
an innovative Norden with a strong focus on welfare,
education and training, creativity, entrepreneurship, sus-
tainability and research. On the other hand, in response
to growing international interest in Nordic experiences
and solutions, the ambition was to promote the Nordic
welfare model as well as the model of Nordic coop-
eration more strongly outside the region, contributing
to a more visible Nordic region. Finally, the vision of
an outward-looking Norden underlined the ambition to
intensify Nordic cooperation with regard to global affairs
as well as within international organizations (Nordisk
Ministerråd, 2014a).
Building on these ambitious future visions, the
Nordic Council ofMinisters initiated a process ofmodern-
ization and reform aimed at highlighting and strengthen-
ing the political relevance of the cooperation, making it
more effective and opening up new fields of cooperation
(Opitz & Etzold, 2018, pp. 3–4). Based on the report Nyt
Norden (‘The New North’) with 39 recommendations by
then the Nordic Council of Ministers Secretary General
Dagfinn Høybråten, the ministers for Nordic cooperation
adopted a catalogue of reforms covering four areas in
autumn 2014: (i) ministerial cooperation, (ii) an effec-
tive the Nordic Council of Ministers Secretariat, (iii) bud-
geting as well as (iv) the project and programme level
(Nordisk Ministerråd, 2014b, pp. 11–12). Among many
proposed measures, the meetings of the ministerial
councils should acquire a stronger strategic focus on rele-
vant policy issues in their respective fields and their long-
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term implications for Nordic cooperation rather than
small-scale administrative issues (Nordisk Ministerråd,
2014b, pp. 26–28). In particular, the need for a more sys-
tematic dialogue on international and EU policy issues
as a significant field of future cooperation has been iden-
tified. Related issues of common interest should be giv-
en a more prominent place on the agenda of all min-
isterial council meetings (Nordisk Ministerråd, 2014b,
p. 4). The recommended changes specifically upgraded
the role of the Secretariat as well as the position of
the Secretary-General and his right to take initiatives as
engines of the cooperation. The latterwas granted explic-
it permission to set the Nordic Council of Ministers’ pro-
cedural rules and meeting agendas (Nordisk Ministerråd,
2014b, pp. 60–61). Furthermore, the budgeting process
for the Nordic Council of Ministers institutions should
become leaner and more flexible. In addition, it set itself
the aim of better linking and evaluating the numerous
Nordic Council of Ministers projects and programmes.
These and more other specific reform measures start-
ed to be implemented soon after, resulting in various
changes in the modes of operation.
This, however, was not the end of the story. The
ministers for Nordic cooperation soon saw the need
to continue and expand the modernization agenda and
to do even more to strengthen the relevance of the
cooperation for politics, business and civil society. The
background to this was the deterioration in relations
with Russia following the crisis in Ukraine, which had
an impact on the Nordic Council of Ministers’ involve-
ment in northwest Russia as it had to close its offices
there which were categorized as foreign agents by
Russian authorities. In addition, the considerable migra-
tion movements of 2015 that directly affected all five
Nordic countries, as well as the EU’s legitimacy crisis,
increased the pressure to take new action in reaction to
these developments and created both new challenges
and opportunities for Nordic cooperation. In spring 2016,
a new report Nordens tid er nu (‘The Nordic Region’s
time is now’) was issued as the basis for further reforms
(Nordisk Ministerråd, 2016a). Building on the earlier
reform report and the changes already concluded and
implemented, it entailed a number of more traditional
key issues, such as developing the North into the world’s
most integrated region, strengthening Nordic commit-
ment to sustainable growth and increasing the dialogue
with the citizens (Nordisk Ministerråd, 2016a, p. 10).
Thus, the main objectives of the 11 measures subse-
quently adopted by the ministers were to continue mak-
ing the cooperation more effective and flexible by cre-
ating more dynamic budgeting procedures and working
modes in the various committees as well as a smoother
interaction between government officials and the min-
isters (Nordisk Ministerråd, 2016a, pp. 9–13). The struc-
tures should be enabled to react more quickly to new
developments and demands. These implied in prac-
tice the reorganization of several ministerial councils.
For example, the council for environment was expand-
ed to include climate in order to provide joint Nordic
climate change initiatives with more political weight
and an institutional basis (Nordisk Ministerråd, 2016a,
pp. 12, 56–58).
The aimof functioningmore flexibly implied that one-
off informal ministerial meetings could be convened and
ad hoc ministerial councils could be established (Nordisk
Ministerråd, 2016a, pp. 12–13, 58–62). Such ad hoc coun-
cils may, within a limited and specified period of time,
deal with a specific field of cooperation not covered by
the existing structures. This proposal was implemented
soon when an ad hoc council for digitalization was inau-
gurated in 2017 for three years. Digitalization is indeed
another topical and important issue asking for political
action, for example to enable the use of national elec-
tronic identification systems across the Nordic borders.
The overarching aim of the new cooperation was to
turn Norden into a digital frontrunner region (Nordisk
Ministerråd, 2018). As a sign of the desired flexibility,
even the Baltic countries were invited to participate in
the ad hoc cooperation although not being members of
the Nordic Council of Ministers. Initially, it also has been
the intention to establish an ad hoc ministerial council
for cooperation in the field of integration of refugees and
immigrants, but related plans have been dropped due
to disagreement among the governments. At least an
informal ministerial meeting in autumn 2016 launched a
cooperation programme on integration. The aim of this
multi-sectoral programme was to coordinate and har-
monise integrationmeasures and to learn from each oth-
er by intensifying the dialogue and exchanging informa-
tion among national agencies on the situation of immi-
grants and refugees in the respective countries (Nordisk
Ministerråd, 2016b). However, its purpose and objec-
tives only came into being on the basis of the lowest com-
mon denominator and remained unclear. In practice, the
programme did not have much relevance and substance
but appeared to have a mainly symbolic value. Closer
cooperation on actual migration and asylum policies,
including intra-Nordic distribution schemes and joint
minimum criteria for accepting refugees as recommend-
ed by several left-wing delegates to the Nordic Council,
has been deemed unthinkable by the governments.
Another important issue in the reform recommenda-
tions was a more prominent role for the heads of gov-
ernment in the formal cooperation, including greater
policy-making powers (Nordisk Ministerråd, 2016a,
pp. 14, 73–74) somewhat along the lines of the EU’s
European Council. Traditionally, prime ministers, foreign
and defence ministers get regularly together in more
informal settings outside the formal structures only.
Therefore, the intension was to link both levels more
closely and to involve the heads of government on a
more systematic and regular basis in ongoing projects of
theNordic Council ofMinisters in order to give the formal
cooperation more political weight and visibility. Toward
this end, instruments such as declarations and political
initiatives by the prime ministers were recommended
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to be used more systematically and regularly. However,
similar ambitions had been expressed various times in
the past without sorting any visible effect. Also this time,
it seems that not much has changed in practice.
Unlike the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Nordic
Council has not initiated any far-reaching structural
reforms since 2001. Its main focus has been on reviv-
ing the political debate and increasing the political rel-
evance of parliamentary cooperation. This also implied
discussing topical but politically sensitive issues of inter-
national interest and relevance outside the official agen-
da of institutionalized Nordic cooperation such as migra-
tion, border controls, EU-affairs and foreign and security
policies. In this regard, the Nordic Council intends to play
the role of initiator encouraging the intergovernmental
level to take its initiatives up and to considermore formal
cooperation in these fields (Opitz & Etzold, 2018, p. 4).
This has, however, only happened to a limited extent so
far, taking into consideration that the Nordic Council’s
recommendations to the Nordic Council of Ministers are
non-binding. To give the Nordic Council’s recommenda-
tions more weight, it would be necessary to elevate the
body in relation to the Nordic Council of Ministers and to
link their activities and themes more closely.
The journey toward more political relevance had not
ended here. In summer 2019, the Nordic Council of
Ministers launched a new vision for Norden according to
which it should become “the most sustainable and inte-
grated region in the world by 2030” (Nordic Council of
Ministers, 2019). The cooperation in the Nordic Council
of Ministers must serve this purpose (Nordic Council of
Ministers, 2019). To put this vision into practice, the
future priorities of the cooperation within the Nordic
Council of Ministers should be to turn the Nordic region
into a green, competitive and socially sustainable Nordic
Region. To succeed, it is necessary that all parts of the
Nordic Council of Ministers’ structures identify and for-
mulate main goals linked to the vision as a basis for
intersectoral action plans for the implementation of the
strategic priorities including a clear allocation of respon-
sibilities (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2019). As already
outlined in the previous reform proposals, representa-
tives of civil society as well as the business communi-
ty were given a voice in this effort as well. In mid-2020,
an action plan for the implementation of the vision had
been drafted. All Nordic ministerial councils and other
Nordic institutions contributed specific proposals within
their area of expertise to the plan.
4. New Relevance through Reforms? Strengths,
Weaknesses and Potential of the Nordic Council
of Ministers
As outlined above, the Nordic Council of Ministers under-
went an incremental transformation process including
optimisation measures as well as several structural and
budgetary reforms since the 1990s. The organisation
showed a general willingness and ability to adapt to new
external circumstances and to conduct several reforms,
although slowly and reluctantly. In a previous study
(Etzold, 2010), this and a number of other pre-conditions
for continued existence and relevance of international
organisations have been derived from theories of inter-
national relations, in this case neoliberal institutionalism
and social-constructivism, as well as organisational the-
ories and applied as independent variables to the case
of the Nordic Council of Ministers and other regional
organisations in Northern Europe. The Nordic Council of
Ministers matched several of these theoretical criteria:
A certain interest in the organisation by member states
so long as it was of use for implementing their interests
in combinationwith past achievements and the prospect
for future success; maintaining old and creating new pur-
poses; a strong anchoring of the idea and concept of
Nordic cooperation in Nordic societies; common values
and elements of a common identity as an ideological
basis for the cooperation; the implementation of at least
some changes and a well-developed and fairly influential
bureaucracy with a secretary-general who owns some
political weight and impact and is able to act as a driv-
er for change.
Still, despite fulfilling these theoretical criteria and
showing at least some adaptability in order to stay in
existence and to retain some relevance, there has nev-
er been a major overhaul of structures and contents
owing to considerable inertia within the Nordic Council
of Ministers. There could indeed be situations in which
big changes are not required to retain an internation-
al organisation’s relevance. But once they appear neces-
sary to keep an organisation going, displaying a principal
willingness to change might not be enough, if it is not fol-
lowed by tangible action. Overall, reforming the Nordic
Council of Ministers has been perceived as difficult since
despite all similarities the Nordic countries are in some
political, economic and administrative respect different.
In addition, views on certain reform measures and new
fields of cooperation, in particular EU affairs, conflicted
considerably. Owing to these differences, various mea-
sures including, for example, abolishing or restructuring
certainministerial councils or committees, received both
approval as well as major criticism from stakeholders.
It appeared that several stakeholders had fairly advanced
ideas for change, while others were mainly interested in
maintaining the status quo.
Therefore, several observers were critical of the
reforms in the 1990s, their results and the organisation’s
significance: In their opinion the reforms have been insuf-
ficient and did not prevent the gradualmarginalization of
the Nordic Council of Ministers (Olesen & Strang, 2016,
p. 35). Also, the reforms undertaken during the 2000s
were rather small-scale. Several of the various measures
taken during these two periods have been similar, using
the same keywords such as ‘more flexibility,’ ‘more effec-
tive,’ ‘increasing political relevance,’ etc., without having
any visible major effect. Therefore, some argued that to
regain any political relevance in the future, the Nordic
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Council/the Nordic Council of Ministers system would
require radical reformnow (Olesen& Strang, 2016, p. 40).
This could imply “tomake theNordic Council ofMinisters
more ad hoc-oriented and flexible and to let it expand
on mutual EU directive implementation and to secure
a more coordinated Nordic voice in the EU” (Olesen &
Strang, 2016, p. 41).
Indeed, the Nordic Council of Ministers’ most recent
attempt to regain strength and impact, to act more flex-
ibly, ad hoc and demand-oriented and to redefine its
position within the wider landscape of cooperation in
Europe has been politically more ambitious and wide-
reaching than previous reform efforts, while again using
similar reform language as before. As outlined above,
it covered more institutional aspects, affecting all its
structures including the ministerial councils, the secre-
tariat and the highest political level, and has therefore
been more comprehensive than previous reform efforts.
The reform process also stretched over a longer period
of time than previous ones and took, divided into two
phases (see above), nearly four years.
While the reform process had officially concluded by
late 2017, an evaluation was conducted in spring 2018
which included a survey among Nordic stakeholders. The
overall conclusion was that the reforms have strength-
ened and improved the work of the Nordic Council of
Ministers and that it therefore has taken an important
step in the right direction (Resonans Kommunikation,
2018, p. 5). There was a wide consensus that the
reforms had laid the groundwork to sharpen the politi-
cal and strategic focus, to allow the Secretariat to work
more effectively and to render the cooperation more
relevant and flexible (Resonans Kommunikation, 2018,
pp. 63–64). The evaluation also revealed an awareness
that the reforms were only the beginning of a longer
process toward a more focussed and modern organisa-
tion which would require more time. Also both strengths
and weaknesses of the process became obvious; it was
widely seen as positive that the implementationwas con-
ducted quickly, the Secretary-General had played a deci-
sive role and seemed to have managed to strengthen his
overall role and positionwithin the organisation and that
important discussions about the added value and pur-
pose of Nordic cooperation have been brought inmotion.
On the other hand, some criticized the fact that there
was not enough space and time for an adequate involve-
ment of all interested stakeholders and that the overall
direction of the process had been unclear due to the very
many recommendations and conclusions going in part-
ly different directions. They wished for more communi-
cation and debate about the process and a clearer nar-
rative including a common and tangible direction that
all could have taken as a point of departure (Resonans
Kommunikation, 2018, pp. 65–66).
The evaluation came perhaps too early and cannot
be regarded as representative with only 56 respondents.
Since most respondents were representatives of the
structures of Nordic cooperation as well as national gov-
ernments, there is also a certain bias at stake. Hardly
any independent assessments on themost recent reform
efforts exist thus far. Two years later, it is still difficult
to judge for outsiders, whether the reform and mod-
ernisation process has been an overall success as sever-
al changes have not been communicated well and are
therefore not very obvious. In several cases it is even diffi-
cult to identify whether and how they have actually been
implemented (see for example the aforementioned case
of the intended strengthened role of the primeministers
in official Nordic cooperation).
The effective implementation of reforms is complicat-
ed by a general problem the Nordic Council of Ministers
and other structures of formal Nordic cooperation are
facing: In recent years several differences in preferences
and ways of handling various political issues among the
five countries have become evident. In this context, an
occasional lack in willingness to coordinate their poli-
cies and to cooperate within the established institution-
al structures by the governments has become apparent.
These features potentially undermine the Nordic Council
of Ministers’ efforts to foster its relevance. As a case
in point, the Nordic countries have not been able to
find common answers to urging international challenges
such as the changing security environment and migra-
tion. Additionally, the current Covid-19 pandemic has
been handled rather differently in the various countries,
driving a wedge between them rather than encourag-
ing further cooperation, for example, in the health sec-
tor or in cross-border crisis management. Instead dur-
ing the migration crisis 2015–2016, border controls had
been reintroduced and in the Covid-19 crisis most intra-
Nordic borders have even been completely closed. These
events can be seen asmajor setbacks for theNordic ambi-
tion of a borderless Norden after many years of work
to abolish border obstacles. In both situations, a partic-
ular lack of communication among the governments as
well as a tendency to return to more national approach-
es became apparent.
Against the backdrop of these and various other chal-
lenges in recent years, the weaknesses and limits of
cooperation within the Nordic Council of Ministers have
become evident: No majority voting or ‘opting-out’ sys-
tem that would allow countries to abstain from a partic-
ular initiative while the remaining countries could move
forward (Strang, 2012, p. 70) adding an extra flexibili-
ty; an overall lack in supra-national structures and poli-
cies; the Nordic Council of Ministers and Nordic cooper-
ation in general seemed to have turned into a platform
for projects and agencies for selling Norden as a trade-
mark rather than a political arena for the dialogue and
cooperation among various stakeholders (Strang, 2020);
no common immigration and asylum policies; no com-
mon foreign and security policies, and lacking progress
in establishing close cooperation and coordination in EU
affairs. Reluctant efforts to establishmore Nordic cooper-
ation in these policy areas have at least resulted in more
informal settings that however do not have an institu-
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tional backbone. This implies that the Nordic Council of
Ministers has a limited role to play in those. For exam-
ple, cooperation in defence policies takes place outside
the Nordic Council of Ministers structures. Likewise, the
Nordic Council of Ministers never evolved into an are-
na or an instrument for the coordination of EU policies
and establishing a joint Nordic agenda on the European
level (Olesen & Strang, 2016, p. 36). Despite related
ambitions, stronger EU cooperation remains difficult to
put into practice owing to different interests and tradi-
tions even today. While the Nordic Council of Ministers
Secretariat principally regards itself as a facilitator, as
a meeting place and as an instrument which could be
used to complement the member states’ EU policies,
in practice, it seems reluctant to take on a more pro-
active role. The old idea to establish a Nordic Council of
Ministers representation in Brussels did not find any sup-
port among the governments at any point. These exam-
ples give proof of a certain dilemma that became appar-
ent in any reform effort within the Nordic Council of
Ministers in recent years. The interests of different stake-
holders did not always match each other; some wanted
to go further than others were willing to go. The con-
sensus principle in decision taking in the Nordic Council
of Ministers is an often-discussed case in point. Several
stakeholders wanted to have it replaced by majority
voting or an ‘opting-out’ system (see above) to render
the organisation more flexible and responsive. Others
argued against it since for them it is an important charac-
teristic standing for the whole principle of Nordic coop-
eration: cooperation in fields where common interests
exist and on which all can agree.
Thus, against the light of the not very favourable cur-
rent pre-conditions, the real effect of the recent reform
efforts in a long-term perspective and hence also the rel-
evance of the Nordic Council of Ministers might partly
depend on whether the Nordic countries will be able to
find a new common understanding on what they want
and are realistically able to achieve together. This applies
to both the cooperation within the existing institution-
al framework as well as more informal settings, in case
the organisation is not perceived as the suitable frame-
work for dealing with certain issues. Tomake this work, a
clear division of labour between both levels and a clear
assignment of responsibilities to each of them would be
helpful. The success of reforms also depends on mutual
support and trust: Governments must transfer the nec-
essary competences and resources to the Nordic Council
of Ministers to achieve results while the institution has
to convince the governments of its added value (Opitz &
Etzold, 2018, p. 8) in order not to be sidelined. TheNordic
Council of Ministers is likely to be relevant to the Nordic
countries and their governments when it is able to make
a contribution to solving common problems and making
the governments communicate and cooperate effective-
ly and efficiently with each other in certain policy areas
such as environment, climate, social affairs and research.
To establish its relevance, it would help when there is
clear evidence that important political decisions affect-
ing Norden have been taken within a Nordic Council
of Ministers setting, i.e., one of the ministerial councils.
Indeed along the lines of Strang’s (2020) aforementioned
assessment, the Nordic Council of Ministers might find
more political relevance when again being used more as
a political arena and as a platform for facilitating the dia-
logue and the cooperation among various stakeholders,
not just governments.
Furthermore, in order to the reforms to be effective
the Nordic Council of Ministers would need to set clear
realistic goals for itself based on an honest assessment
of what the organisation is actually capable of. Visions
such as the one of August 2019 can be useful to set ambi-
tions and the general path for future cooperation and
look attractive as a trademark and selling point. As an
overall guideline they might be particularly helpful when
they match the capacities and capabilities of an organi-
sation to achieve such ambitious goals. Otherwise they
might just cause disappointment. Owing to the current
circumstances and challenges, it is at least questionable
whether it is feasible and realistic for the Nordic Council
of Ministers to turn the Nordic region into the “most
integrated and sustainable region in the world” (Nordic
Council of Ministers, 2019) and whether it is really nec-
essary to be ‘best.’ The main goal might rather be to
find common solutions to tangible common challenges
through cooperation, matching the organisation’s capa-
bilities and strengths.
5. Conclusions and Perspectives
Despite obvious shortcomings and inertia, the Nordic
Council of Ministers has at least undertaken several
efforts to adapt to new external circumstances in the
past and to retain some relevance and meaning for the
Nordic countries’ governments. The organisation is par-
ticularly able to achieve tangible results in those policy
areas in which common interests exist such as environ-
ment, climate, research, removing border obstacles and
social affairs. The most recent reform process has been
ambitious, thus more ambitious than the previous ones,
affecting various institutional aspects. It has sorted some
positive effect in some areas, while in others clear results
are not in place so far or not visible. The current difficult
circumstances and challenges do not make any reform
process an easy task.
Against the background of the Nordic Council of
Ministers’ strengths, weaknesses and shortcomings,
Nordic cooperation as it is conducted within the Nordic
Council of Ministers can most fittingly be characterized
by differentiated integration rather than constituting a
common political order of its own. Differentiated inte-
gration is currently widely discussed in academic cir-
cles against the light of the UK’s exit from the EU (for
example Gänzle, Leruth, & Trondal, 2019). Along these
lines, the Nordic Council of Ministers promotes full inte-
gration only to a limited degree but respects integra-
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tion to different extents and speeds by fostering coop-
eration and coordination of only certain policies where
these are possible or desired and provide some further
added value. It might indeed strengthen Nordic coop-
eration and the Nordic Council of Ministers in particu-
lar if the Nordic countries would be able to develop a
strong common political voice in European and interna-
tional affairs by establishing effective joint policies and if
the Nordic Council of Ministers would be able to play a
role in this. But this cannot be forced so long as a strong
common political will and a strong common denomina-
tor do not exist. This creates a certain dilemma. But
instead of cooperating on the basis of the lowest com-
mon denominator, the Nordic Council of Ministers might
rather focus on a selected number of aforementioned
areas in which close cooperation is politically most rel-
evant, in which strong common interest exist, where
an added value is given and where the Nordic coun-
tries and their citizens could profit most from the coop-
eration. By doing so, the Nordic Council of Ministers
could still complement and contribute to efforts at the
European/EU level trough joint action by building on its
strengths and simultaneously being aware of its limits.
Even without striving for deeper integration, the body
could serve as a role model for cooperation among oth-
er groups of countries of one region, consisting of both
EU member as well as non-member states. Both from
an International as well as European Studies perspec-
tive, the Nordic Council of Ministers is also a good exam-
ple of how international organisations despite difficul-
ties at least attempt to adapt to new external circum-
stances and try to retain or even strengthen their rele-
vance. Whether these attempts have been successful in
the long run is a question for further research.
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